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Summary
On February 1, 2003, NASA’s Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart while returning
to Earth from a 16-day science mission in orbit.  All seven astronauts — six Americans
and one Israeli — were killed.  An investigation is underway.  This report provides
quick facts about Columbia, her crew, the STS-107 mission, the status of the
investigation, and a brief discussion of issues for Congress.  Additional information on
the space shuttle program is available in CRS Issue Brief IB93062.  CRS Reports
RS21411 and RS21419 describe space shuttle funding, and provide excerpts from recent
reports and hearings on shuttle safety, respectively.  This report will be updated often.
The Loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia
The space shuttle Columbia was launched on its STS-107 mission on January 16,
2003.  After completing a 16-day scientific research mission, Columbia started its descent
to Earth on the morning of February 1, 2003.   As it descended from orbit, approximately
16 minutes before its scheduled landing at Kennedy Space Center, FL,  Columbia broke
apart over northeastern Texas.  All seven astronauts aboard were killed.  They were
Commander Rick Husband; Pilot William McCool; Mission Specialists Michael P.
Anderson, David M. Brown, Kalpana Chawla, and Laurel Clark; and payload specialist
Ilan Ramon, an Israeli.  The last communication with Columbia was at about 09:00 EST.
The shuttle was at an altitude of 207,135 feet, traveling at a speed of Mach 18.3 (about
13,000 miles per hour).
NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe immediately appointed an internal “Mishap
Investigation Board,” and also an external group, the “Columbia Accident  Investigation
Board,” to investigate the accident.  Information on the investigation is available at
[http://www.nasa.gov/columbia]. The external group is chaired by Retired Navy Admiral
Harold Gehman, who co-chaired the independent commission that investigated the attack
on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen.  The other original members are: Rear Admiral Stephen
Turcotte, Commander, U.S. Naval Safety Center, Norfolk, VA; Major General John L.
Barry, Director, Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-
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1 The Space Transportation System (STS)—the space shuttle—consists of an airplane-like
orbiter, two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) on either side of the orbiter, and a large cylindrical
External Tank that holds the fuel for the orbiter’s main engines.  The SRBs detach from the
orbiter about 2 ½ minutes after launch when their fuel is spent, fall into the ocean, and are
recovered for refurbishment and reuse.   The External Tank is not reused.  It is jettisoned as the
orbiter reaches Earth orbit, and disintegrates as it falls into the Indian Ocean.
Patterson Air Force Base, OH; Major General Kenneth W. Hess, Commander, U.S. Air
Force Chief of Safety, Kirtland Air Force Base, NM; Dr. James N. Hallock, Aviation
Safety Division Chief, U.S. Department of Transportation, Cambridge, MA; Steven B.
Wallace, Director of Accident Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration,
Washington, DC; Brigadier General Duane Deal, Commander 21st Space Wing, Peterson
Air Force Base, CO; and G. Scott Hubbard, Director, NASA Ames Research Center.
Roger Tetrault, retired from McDermott International, and Dr. Shiela Widnall, former
Secretary of the Air Force, later joined the Board.   Bryan D. O’Connor, NASA Associate
Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance (and a former astronaut), is an ex officio
member; and NASA Chief Engineer Theron Bradley, is the Executive Secretary.  NASA
has revised the Board’s charter three times to clarify its independence of NASA, primarily
in response to congressional concerns.  Because the Board was created by NASA,
includes NASA representatives, and is largely staffed by NASA employees, concerns still
exist, however. NASA transitioned responsibility for the investigation to the Gehman
Board on February 6.  There is no time limit on the Board’s investigation. 
Speculation about the cause of the accident continues to focus on damage that may
have been caused to the thermal protection system (“tiles”) on the shuttle by a piece of
insulating foam that fell off the shuttle’s External Tank1  81 seconds after launch.   NASA
estimates that the piece weighed 2.67 pounds and measured 20x16x6 inches.  It struck the
orbiter in the area of the left wing, and the first indications of trouble during Columbia’s
reentry was the loss of data from sensors on that wing, and other sensors registering rising
temperatures.  The day after the launch, NASA experts reviewing footage of the launch
discerned the foam hitting the orbiter.  NASA convened a panel to review the footage and
concluded that it created no safety of flight issue.  NASA is reanalyzing the information.
Another possibility being investigated is that the shuttle was struck by space debris during
its 16-day mission. On February 13, the Gehman Board announced that preliminary
analysis by NASA indicated that the temperature rise detected by the sensors would
require the presence in the wing of the plasma (super heated gas) that surrounds the
shuttle during reentry.  It added that heat transfer through the structure—as if a tile was
missing—would not be sufficient to cause the temperature rise that was detected.  
If tile damage was the problem, the astronauts could not have repaired the tiles in
orbit.  Astronauts are trained to make emergency spacewalks into the shuttle’s cargo bay
to deal with various contingencies, but they cannot maneuver around to the belly of the
orbiter where the tiles are located, and there is no method to repair a damaged tile on
orbit, according to NASA.  NASA officials stated soon after the accident that no changes
could have been made to the reentry profile to protect a damaged area of tiles and still
ensure the safe return of the crew and orbiter. The Associated Press reported on February
7, however, that NASA did change the reentry profile for the space shuttle Atlantis in May
2000 (STS-101) when tile damage was suspected on that orbiter. 
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Space Shuttle Columbia
Columbia was one of four flightworthy reusable space shuttle orbiters in NASA’s
fleet.  The others are Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavour.  A fifth orbiter, Challenger, was
lost in a 1986 accident. Another orbiter, Enterprise, was used for approach and landing
tests in the 1970s and was not designed to travel in space.
Columbia was the first spaceflight-worthy orbiter built for NASA by Rockwell
International (the space division of Rockwell, which built the orbiters, was later bought
by Boeing). It was used for the very first shuttle flight on April 12, 1981. The mission that
ended tragically on February 1, 2003, STS-107, was Columbia’s 28th flight.  Although
Columbia is the oldest orbiter, Discovery has been used for more flights (30).  Orbiters
are periodically taken out of service for maintenance and overhaul.  Columbia underwent
an inspection and retrofit program from August 1991-February 1992, was in an “orbiter
maintenance down period” (OMDP) in 1994-1995, and a second OMDP in 1999-2001.
Its first flight after the second OMDP was STS-109 in March 2001, a servicing mission
to the Hubble Space Telescope.  STS-107 was its second flight after the OMDP.
Columbia’s STS-107 Crew2
Commander: Air Force Colonel Rick D. Husband, b. July 12, 1957, Amarillo, TX. 
Married, two children.   Col. Husband was making his second flight into space, having
served as pilot of STS-96 in 1999.  He received a BS in mechanical engineering from
Texas Tech University in 1980 and a MS in mechanical engineering from California State
University-Fresno in 1990.
Pilot:  Navy Commander William “Willie” McCool, b. September 23, 1961, San
Diego, CA.  Married, three children.  Commander McCool was making his first
spaceflight.  He received  a BS in applied science from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1983,
an MS in Computer Science from the University of Maryland in 1985, and an MS in
aeronautical engineering from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 1992.  
Payload Commander/Mission Specialist 3: Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Michael
P. Anderson, b. December 25, 1959, Plattsburgh, NY.  Married. two children.  Col.
Anderson was making his second spaceflight, having served on the crew of STS-89.  He
received a BS in physics/astronomy from the University of Washington in 1981 and an
MS in physics from Creighton University in 1990.
Mission Specialist 1: Navy Captain David M. Brown, b. April 16, 1956, Arlington,
VA.  Single.  Capt. Brown was making his first spaceflight.  He received a BS in biology
from the College of William and Mary in 1978 and a doctorate in medicine from Eastern
Virginia Medical School in 1982.
Mission Specialist 2: Dr. Kalpana Chawla, b. July 1, 1961, Karnal, India.  Married.  Dr.
Chawla is a naturalized U.S. citizen, and was making her second spaceflight.  She
received a BS in aeronautical engineering from Punjab Engineering College, India, in
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3 Summarized from NASA’s Press Kit for the STS-107 mission available at
[http://spaceflight.nasa.gov] and news accounts.
1982; an MS in aerospace engineering from the University of Texas in 1984; and a PhD
in aerospace engineering from the University of Colorado in 1988.
Mission Specialist 4: Navy Commander (captain-select) Laurel Blair Salton Clark,
b. March 10, 1961, Ames, Iowa, but considered Racine, WI as her hometown.  Married,
one child.  Commander Clark was making her first spaceflight.  She received a BS in
zoology from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1983 and a doctorate in medicine
from the same school in 1987.
Payload Specialist: Colonel, Israeli Air Force, Ilan Ramon, b. June 20, 1954, Tel
Aviv, Israel.  Married, four children.  Col. Ramon was making his first spaceflight.  He
received a BS in electronic and computer engineering from the University of Tel Aviv,
Israel, in 1987.  
The STS-107 Mission3
STS-107 was a scientific research mission that, unlike most current shuttle launches,
was not related to the International Space Station (ISS) program. The launch of STS-107
had been delayed for a variety of reasons since the summer of 2001.
STS-107 carried a SPACEHAB Double Module, built by SPACEHAB Inc., in the
shuttle’s cargo bay, which allows astronauts to conduct scientific experiments in a “shirt-
sleeve” environment.   The crew, working round-the-clock, conducted a research program
involving 32 payloads, with 59 separate investigations.  SPACEHAB marketed 18% of
the module’s capacity to international and industry commercial users, while NASA
experiments made up the remaining 82%.  The experiments arranged through
SPACEHAB included three bone-growth experiments for the Canadian Space Agency,
a biological experiment for the German space agency, and university-sponsored research
in protein crystal growth, and navigation.  The U.S. Air Force conducted a
communications experiment, and students from six schools in Australia, China, Israel,
Japan, Liechtenstein, and the United States probed the effects of spaceflight on spiders,
silkworms, inorganic crystals, fish, bees, and ants, respectively.  Other experiments were
attached to the outside of the SPACEHAB Double Module, or on a bridge-like structure
mounted across Columbia’s payload bay.  The latter, called Fast Reaction Experiments
Enabling Science, Technology, Applications and Research (FREESTAR), included the
Mediterranean Israeli Dust Experiment which involved observations of Israel from space.
Some of the research required analysis of specimens and data sets after the shuttle
returned to Earth, and they were destroyed along with the crew and orbiter.  Other data,
however, were transmitted to ground-based researchers during the flight, so some of the
crew’s scientific research did survive them.  Quantifying the amount is difficult.
Security Concerns
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, NASA
took additional security precautions to protect space shuttle launches.  Among the changes
CRS-5
was a decision not to announce the exact time a shuttle would be launched until 24 hours
in advance.  This practice was followed for STS-107.
Because of the threat of terrorism, and the presence of an Israeli astronaut on the
mission, questions have arisen as to whether the loss of Columbia could be attributed to
terrorism.  At this time, government officials have stressed that there is no evidence that
the tragedy could have been caused by terrorists.  They point out, for example, that
surface-to-air missiles cannot reach the altitude where the shuttle broke apart.  NASA
Administrator O’Keefe stated on February 1 that “We have no indication that the mishap
was caused by anything or anyone on the ground.”   However, no possibility is being ruled
out at this early stage of the investigation.
Previous Crew Fatalities During Space Missions
The United States has suffered two other spaceflight-related accidents that caused
astronaut fatalities.  On January 27, 1967, the three-man crew of the first Apollo mission
died when a fire erupted in their Apollo command module during a pre-launch test.  The
three astronauts were Virgil “Gus” Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee.  A
NASA investigation determined that electrical arcing in spacecraft wiring caused the fire.
Modifications were made to the Apollo design and test procedures before Apollo flights
resumed 21 months later.
On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle Challenger (STS 51-L) exploded 73 seconds
after launch, killing all seven astronauts aboard: Francis “Dick” Scobee, Michael Smith,
Judith Resnik, Ellison Onizuka, Ronald McNair, Gregory Jarvis (a payload specialist from
Hughes Aircraft), and schoolteacher Christa McAuliffe.  President Reagan appointed a
special commission to investigate the accident, chaired by former Secretary of State
William Rogers.  The Rogers Commission determined that cold weather at the launch site
caused a rubber “O-ring” in one of the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) to fail, allowing
gases to escape, resulting in a catastrophic explosion. The shuttle system was grounded
for 32 months while NASA redesigned the SRBs.  The shuttle returned to flight in
September 1988.  Congress appropriated $2.1 billion to build a replacement for
Challenger.  The new orbiter, Endeavour, made its first flight in May 1992.
Four Soviet cosmonauts also died during spaceflights.  Cosmonaut Vladimir
Komarov died during the first Soyuz flight on April 24, 1969. The spacecraft’s parachute
tangled during descent and it struck the ground with great force, killing Colonel Komarov.
Soviet human spaceflights were suspended for 18 months while the Soviets investigated
and remedied the problem.  Three cosmonauts died on Soyuz 11 on June 29, 1971 when
an improperly sealed valve allowed the spacecraft’s atmosphere to vent into space.  The
cosmonauts—Georgiy Dobrovolskiy, Vladislav Volkov, and Viktor Patsayev— were not
wearing spacesuits, and were asphyxiated.  There were no Soviet human spaceflights for
27 months while modifications were made to the spacecraft.
Issues for Congress
As the causes of the Columbia tragedy are investigated, Congress and the Bush
Administration are facing a number of issues.  A forthcoming CRS report will explore
some of these issues in more detail, but the following is a brief list of questions likely to
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frame the debate.  A key factor in evaluating many of these questions is how long the
shuttle system may be grounded. That will not be known until the cause of the accident
is determined and remedial steps identified. 
! Was funding for the shuttle program adequate to ensure shuttle safety?
! Did NASA adequately respond to concerns expressed over the past
several years by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel and others that the
shuttle program was under stress due to funding and workforce
constraints?
! Did NASA adequately investigate damage that might have been caused
to Columbia’s heat resistant tiles by foam that fell from the External
Tank during launch? If Columbia had been damaged, was there anything
NASA could have done to ensure the safe return of Columbia’s crew,
such as changing the reentry profile or launching a rescue mission with
another orbiter? 
! Is the Columbia Accident Investigation Board—comprised of current or
former government officials—the best group to assist NASA in this
investigation, or should non-government experts be included?  Should
the White House establish a “blue-ribbon” commission as was done
following the Challenger tragedy in 1986?
! What are the funding implications of the Columbia accident for the space
shuttle program, and for the space station program, which relies on the
shuttle for assembly and operation?
! What strategy should guide operation of the International Space Station
while the space shuttle system is grounded?  Should permanent
occupancy of the space station be suspended until the shuttle system is
operating again, or should the space station partners (the United States,
Russia, Europe, Japan, and Canada) rely on Russian Soyuz and Progress
spacecraft to bring crews and cargo to space station?
! If the decision is made to rely on Russian Soyuz and Progress spacecraft
beyond those that Russian already has agreed to provide at no cost to the
other partners, who will pay for them?  In this context, it is important to
recall that the Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178) prohibits NASA
from making payments to Russia, in cash or in kind, in connection with
the space station program unless the President certifies to Congress that
Russia is not proliferating nuclear or missile technologies to Iran.
! Should a replacement orbiter be built?  If so, how much will it cost and
how long will it take?  If not, can NASA service the Hubble Space
Telescope and continue assembly and operation of the space station with
only three orbiters?
! What changes are needed to NASA’s recently revised Integrated Space
Transportation Plan?  Should efforts to develop an Orbital Space Plane,
announced in that plan, be accelerated instead of building a replacement
for Columbia?  To what extent can those plans be accelerated?
! Are the benefits of human spaceflight worth the risks and costs?
A joint hearing between the Senate Commerce Committee and the House Science
Committee was held on February 12, 2003.
